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CASES NOTED
soned that even if the action in Korea should be found to be a war, it is at
most an undeclared war. If the defendant insurance company intended the
term "war" to include undeclared war its intentions should have been made
clear in unambiguous terms. This has been done 2 by other insurance com-
panies since the "Pearl Harbor Cases."'3
Not being concerned with the actualities of the hostilities in Korea, the
court's conclusion that they do not constitute a war seems to be well sup-
ported. The case also serves to emphasize that where private parties have
occasion to contract with reference to war, the term "war" will be construed
in its legal sense unless the parties give it some other definition or meaning
by contract.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-LIABILITY OF A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
TO COUNTERCLAIM IN FEDERAL COURTS
Defendants counterclaimed in a United States District Court for libel.
Plaintiffs, a foreign nation, moved to have the counterclaim dismissed, assert-
ing sovereign immunity. Held, a counterclaim not arising out of the same
transaction would be dismissed. Republic of China v. Pang-Tsu Mow, 105
F. Supp. 411 (D.D.C. 1952).
Until the early eighteenth century no offset of one debt against another
was allowed unless the debts were mutually connected.' In the latter part
of the eighteenth century a right of set-off in bankruptcy was allowed to
abolish certain injustices.2 Subsequently, statutes pertaining to set-off were
enacted governing the right to counterclaim in any suit.3  These statutes
tended to confuse the federal courts who failed to distinguish counterclaim,
recoupment and set-off. 4
Recoupment and set-off are derived from the English common and
statutory law whereas counterclaim is purely of code origin. Recoupment
arose out of the same transaction which formed the basis of the plaintiff's
security." (Under the authority of this article the Security Council resolution of June
27, 1950 recommended "that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to
the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore interna.
tional peace and security in the area."); Vol. XXIII, No. 574 Dep't State Bull. 5 (July
3, 1950) (the President's action seeks to accomplish the objective of the Security Council
resolution).
12. Stinson vI. New York Life Ins. Co,, 167 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948).
13. See note 9 supra.
1. 78 IR L.T. 93 (1944); 26 HIaRv. L. REV. 490 (Supp. 1932).
2. STAT. 4 & 5 AmE. c. 4 (1705); STAT. 5 GEO. 1, c. 24 (1718); STAT. 5 GEo. 2,
c. 30 (1731).
3. CoM. LAW PROCEDURE ACT § 83 (17 & 18 VICT. C. 125) (1854); In re Cross,
265 Fed. 769 (N.D. N.Y. 1920); Bankers v. Jarvis, 1 K.B. 549 (1903); 29 HALSBUBY S
LAws OF EN. 482 n. (u) (2d 1938).
4. 25 MINN. L. REV. 801 (1940); 26 A.J. INT. L. 493 (Supp. 1939).
5. JUDICATURE ACT § 24 (1873); 2 GEo. II c. 22 (1728); Curtis-Warner Corp. v.
Thirkettle, 99 N.J. 806, 134 Atl. 299 (1926); HALSaURY'S LAws, supr note 4.
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action. It was purely defensive, limited to the amount of plaintiff's claim,
and was not barred by the statute of limitations. Set-off, on the other hand,
arose out of a different transaction. It was not limited to the plaintiff's
claim and would constitute an affirmative defense against which a statute
of limitations would run.7 Today, statutes and procedural rules express
counterclaim as a combination of common law recoupment and set-off.
The presently effective rule goveming permissive counterclaim in the
federal courts declares that "a pleading may state as a counterclaim any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of" the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." 10
Whether a strict or liberal interpretation of this rule is employed, it must
be conceded that it allows set-off as well as recoupmcnt.
Notwithstanding the clarity of this rule of procedure, courts take
exception when a foreign sovereign is a party to the suit.1 ' Such a holding
which is at variance with a seemingly self explanatory rule is justified on
a jurisdictional basis. The adoption of the said rule by the Supreme
Court, under powers granted in the Enabling Act,12 states that rule 13(b)
is subject to rule 8218 which declares that no rule of the court can extend
or abridge federal jurisdiction." A determination of jurisdiction is there-
6. WATERMAN' SET-OFF, RECOUPMENT AND COUNTERCLAIM (2d ed. 1938); POM-
EROY, CODE REMEDIES § 607 (5th ed. 1929).
7. WATERMAN, SET-OFF, RECOUPMENT AND COUNTERCLAIM 1, 276, 425 (2d ed.
1938); POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 607 (5th ed. 1929).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 13; 28 U.S.C. § 723(1948); FLA. STAT. § 52.11 (1951); In re
Cross, 265 Fed. 769, 774 (N.D. N.Y. 1920); First Nat. Bank of Rocky Ford v. Lewis, 57
Colo. 124, 139 Pac. 1102, 1103 (1914); Fricke v. W. E. Frittener Battery & Supply Co.,
220 Mo. App. 623, 288 S.W. 1000, 1002 (1926); Williams v. Williams, 192 N.C. 405,
135 S.E. 39 (1926); Curtis-Warner Corp. v. Thirkettle, 99 N.J. 806, 134 At]. 299
(1926); Sturtevant v. Dawson, 110 Ore. 155, 219 Pac. 802, 804 (1923).
9. Italics supplied.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
11. Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 250 Fed. 341 (Zd Cir.
1918); United States v. New York Trust Co.. 75 F. Supp. 583 (S.D. N.Y. 1946). In
equity the courts base their decision on FED. EQUITY RULE 30, 28 U.S.C. § 723 e.g.,
United States v. Nat. City Bank of N.Y., 83 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1936); Republic of
China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1951) (This case relied on the
Thekla case wherein the United States was a party to the suit. Observe that if the law
concerning sovereign immunity as to the counterclaims applies to the United States it
will also apply to a foreign sovereign, but if the law does not apply to the United States
it does not mean that it will not apply to a foreign sovereign). French Republic v.
Inland Nay. Co., 263 Fed. 410 (E.D. Mo. 1920); See McLean v. Commonwealth, 293
Fed. 192 (9th Cir. 1923). Local state procedural law is also applied. However, based
on the reasoning of this note, its correctness is questionable. Republic of Haiti v. Plesch,
73 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1947). See Irish Free State v. Guaranty Safe Deposit Co., 212 N.Y.
Supp. 421 (1925). But see Kingdom of Norway v. Fed. Sugar Refining Co., 286 Fed.
188 (S.D. N.Y. 1923).
12. The Enabling Act of June 19, 1934 authorized the Supreme Court of the United
States to prescribe general rules for the federal courts.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 82; BARRoN & HOLTZOr'F, FED. PRACT. & PROCEDURE, Adv. Comm.
Reports, vol. 3 p. 675, vol. 1 p. 789.
14. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); Keys Fibre Co. v. Chaplin Corp., 76 F.
Supp. 981 (S.D. Me. 1947); Brandsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F.
Supp. 314 (E.D. Wis. 1940); Staude Mfg. Co. v. Berles Carton Co., 32 F. Supp. 572
(E.D. N.Y. 1940).
CASES NOTED
fore necessary before any claim can be filed against an opposing claimant.
Any counterclaim requiring independent jurisdiction, such as an affirmative
permissive counterclaim, must be excluded unless the court has, apart
from the suit in litigation, independent jurisdiction over said claim.' 5
Without this verification as to jurisdictional limitation, procedural rule
13(b)' 0 would mislead one into believing that the court could litigate
any counterclaim so long as it had jurisdiction over the initial suit.
In dealing with counterclaim, it is recognized that independent grounds
of jurisdiction are not necessary when a counterclaim arises out of the same
transaction,' 7 nor, if permissive, when it is in the nature of a defense rather
than an affirmative claim.' 8 But any permissive counterclaim that is un-
connected with the transaction requires an independent ground of juris-
diction before the court can litigate the claim. 19 In the instant case, the
sovereign plaintiff moved to dismiss a permissive counterclaim on the basis
of immunity. The court granted the motion on the ground that a
friendly sovereign subjects itself to counterclaim only to the extent of
recoupment. The court cites no authority for its decision. However, in
effect, the decision recognized a limitation of jurisdiction as to claims
that do not arise out of the same transaction to which the sovereign has
consented to litigate.
The federal court, having no independent ground of jurisdiction over
claims wherein a foreign sovereign is a party to the suit, has no authority
to litigate the claims without the consent of the sovereign. 20 Consent
grants jurisdiction. However, consent to litigate a certain transaction does
not constitute consent to litigate independent claims. There being no
jurisdiction over independent claims, the sovereign is within its inherent
right to refuse such claims for lack of jurisdiction.21  This leaves the
sovereign liable to the extent of common law recoupment, a claim arising
out of the initial transaction to which the sovereign agreed to litigate.
This is no new version of the rule, it simply states its limitations. Rule
13(b) is substantially a broadened rule of Federal Equity Rule 3022 and it
applies to private litigants as well. Whether with foreign nations, as a
concern of sovereign immunity; or private suitors, as a concern of ordinary
15. Kuster Laboratories v. Lee, 10 F.R.D. 350 (D.C. Cal. 1950); Lesnik v. Public
Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2nd Cir. 1944); 45 YALE L.J. 393 (1936).
16, See note 12 supra.
17, U. OF Pxrr. L. REV. 1, 17, 19 (1940).
18. Rubsam v. Harley C. Loney Co., 86 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Mich. 1949); Marks v.
Spitz, 4 F.R.D. 348 (D.C. Mass. 1945).
19. Jewish Consumptives Relief Soc. v. Rothfield, 9 F.R.D. 64 (D.C. N.Y. 1949);
McCarthy v. M & M Transp. Co., 5 F.R.D. 290 (D.C. Mass. 1946); 15 TENN. L. REV,
20, Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Republic of China v. American
Express Co., 195 F.2d 230 (2nd Cir. 1951); 35 YALE L.J. 150 (1935).
21. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 644 (2d ed. 1947).
22. General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932); American
Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U.S. 360 (1922); Carter Oil Co. v. Wood, 30 F,
Supp. 875 (E.D. Ill. 1940).
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federal jurisdiction over the subject matter, if the courts fail to have the
necessary independent jurisdiction over the affirmative claim, a counter-
claim will be limited to "a claim arising out of the same transaction as
that upon which suit was brought."23
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN
RESIDENT AND NON-RESIDENT USERS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
A non-resident user of the water and sewage system sought to enjoin
the municipality from raising the water rate one and a half times the rate
charged residents and raising the sewage rate to double that charged residents.
Held, the municipality could not charge non-residents higher taxes solely
because they were residing outside of the corporate limits. City of Texarkana
v. Wiggins, 246 S.W.2d 622 (Texas 1952).
The earliest cases on the reasonableness of rates dealt chiefly, if not
exclusively, with private corporations.' As a result, it is well settled that a
private corporation doing a public service cannot charge discriminatory or
unreasonable rates to customers in the same class.2 With the development
of municipal ownership of formerly private utility companies, the question
arose as to the rights and duties of a city in regard to the rates charged.
These rights and duties, in general, have been decided to be neither more
nor less than those held by a private corporation." However, when faced
with the instant problem, discrimination against non-residents, courts4 have
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (g); see FED. R. Civ. P. 82. See note 10 supra.
1. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. City of National City, 74 Fed 79 (C.C.S.D. Cal.
1896); City of Council of Montgomery v. Capital City Water Co., 92 Ala. 376, 9 So.
337 (1890); City Council of Montgomery v. Montgomery Waterworks Co., 77 Ala. 248
(1884); Spring Valley Waterworks v. City and County of San Francisco, 52 Cal. 111
1877 ; Burlington Waterworks Co. v. City of Burlington, 43 Kan. 725, 23 Pac. 1068
1890); Nicholasville Water Co. v. Board of Councilmen of Town of Nicholasville, 36
.W. 549 (Ky. 1896); Borough of Carlisle v. Carlisle Gas & Water Co., 4 Atl. 179
(Pa. 1886).
2. Danville v. Danville Water Co., 180 Ill. 235, 54 N.E. 224 (1899); State ex rel
Latshaw v. Water & Light Comrn'rs, 105 Minn. 472, 117 N.W. 827 (1908); Griffin v.
Goldsboro Water Co., 122 N.C. 206, 30 S.E. 319 (1898); Armour Packing Co. v. Edison
Electric Illuminating Co., 115 App. Div. 51, 100 N.Y. Supp. 605 (3d Dep't 1926); Cin-
cinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Bowling Green, 57 Ohio St. 336, 49 N.E. 121 (1896).
3. Montgomery v. Greene, 180 Ala. 322, 60 So. 900 (1913); Nourse v. Los Angeles.
25 Cal. App. 384, 143 Pac. 801 (1914); American Aniline Products v. Lock Haven, 288
Pa. 420, 135 At]. 726 (19271; Galveston v. Kenner, 111 Tex. 484, 240 S.W. 894 (1922).
4. City of Phoenix v. Kasun, 97 P.2d 210 (Ariz. 1939); Durant v. City of Beverly
Hills, 39 Cal. App.2d 133, 102 P.2d 759 (Cal. 1940); City of Englewood v. City &
County r'f Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 229 P.2d 667 (1951); Cooper v. Tampa Electric Co.,
154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ca. 753, 58
S.E.2d 873 (1950); Davisworth v. City of Lexington, 311 Ky. 606, 224 S.W.2d 649
(1949); Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. J. E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); Atlantic Const. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 230
N.C. 365, 53 S.E.2d 165 (1949); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Comm'n, 137 Pa. Super. Ct. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939); Childs v. City of Columbia, 87 S.C.
566, 70 S.E. 296 (1911); City of Sweetwater v. Hamner, 259 S.W. 191 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923).
